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Abstract 
  
Many voices and stories have been systematically silenced in interpersonal 
conversations, political deliberations and historical narratives. Recalcitrant and 
interrelated patterns of epistemic, political, cultural and economic marginalisation 
exclude individuals as knowers, citizens, agents. Two questions lie at the centre of this 
paper, which focuses on the epistemically – but also politically, culturally, and 
economically – dominant:  How can we sabotage the dominant’s investment in their 
own ignorance of unjust silencing? How can they be seduced to become acute 
perceivers of others’ experiences of oppression and reckon with their own 
participation in it? Situated at the intersection between political theory, aesthetics, and 
epistemology, this paper contributes a so-far-unexplored suggestion: that certain 
literary works create epistemic friction between shared, entrenched prejudices on the 
one hand, and representations of epistemic exclusion or authority, on the other. Their 
power to illuminate ideational, moral, and experiential limitations makes them 
valuable tools in problematising, rendering visible and dislocating epistemic injustice, 
as well as other marginalisations it intersects with. To advance this argument, the 
paper relies on insights from aesthetics, unpacking fiction’s multidimensional 
epistemic potential. Audre Lorde exemplifies literary works’ ability to seductively 
sabotage bias and provide audiences with prosthetic visions of unfamiliar experiences 
of marginalisation. 
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The Problem 
Many voices and stories have been systematically silenced in interpersonal 
conversations, political deliberations and historical narratives. Recalcitrant and 
interrelated patterns of epistemic, political, cultural and economic marginalisation 
exclude individuals as knowers, citizens, agents. Two questions lie at the centre of this 
paper, which focuses on the epistemically – but also politically, culturally, and 
economically – dominant:  How can we sabotage the dominant’s investment in their 
own ignorance of unjust silencing? How can they be seduced to become acute 
perceivers of others’ experiences of oppression and reckon with their own 
participation in it? Situated at the intersection between political theory, aesthetics, and 
epistemology, this paper proposes artistically-induced epistemic friction as a fruitful 
answer. 
The technical term ‘epistemic injustice’ refers to arbitrary distributions of 
epistemic authority, as well as exclusions from processes of collective meaning-
making, due to resilient group biases. While Miranda Fricker’s Epistemic Injustice 
(2007) rejuvenated the debate (e.g. Alcoff, 2010; Maitra, 2010; Dotson, 2011, 2012; 
Anderson, 2012; Polhaus, 2012; Origgi, 2012; Bohman, 2012; Medina, 2013b; Kwong, 
2015; Sherman, 2016), the topic has been of ongoing interest in feminist (e.g. Lugones, 
1987; Harding, 1991; Hornsby and Langton, 1998; Alcoff, 2000), critical race (e.g. Mills, 
2007; Collins, 2008), and postcolonial theory (e.g. Mohanty, 1984; Spivak, 1998, 2016; 
Mignolo, 2009; de Sousa Santos, 2014). Debates focus on the typology of epistemic 
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injustice, attributions of responsibility, its relation to other injustices, its pernicious 
effects on individuals and communities, as well as strategies to counter such effects. 
The starting point here is that a plausible and politically relevant theory of epistemic 
injustice must simultaneously address individual responsibility for, and structural 
causes of, epistemic injustice. Moreover, it must situate epistemic injustice within 
broader patterns of political, cultural, and economic marginalisation.  
This paper proposes that literary works are important, yet unexplored, 
resources in combating epistemic injustice.i Different forms of artistic expression often 
help victims and their communities articulate and communicate their experiences. 
However, our focus lies with certain literary works’ epistemic value for the 
epistemically dominant, who have a vested interest in their own ignorance. 
Literature’s seductive ability to illuminate ideational, experiential, and moral 
limitations renders it a valuable ally in the effort to apprehend the causes, mechanics, 
and effects of epistemic injustice – and of other injustices it compounds. Literary 
encounters might also fuel political solidarity and struggles: they could be valuable to 
resisters of all stripes in challenging entrenched exclusions. An engagement with 
Audre Lorde’s theory and poetry will hopefully exemplify the plausibility of this 
theoretical proposal.  
I first locate the paper within the literature, outlining its main assumptions and 
providing an account of artistically induced epistemic friction that is ideational, moral, 
and experiential. The second section invites an excursus into the philosophy of art and 
unpacks artworks’ capacity to seductively sabotage entrenched exclusionary habits of 
4 
 
thought. Certain works can help perpetrators and witnesses of epistemic injustice 
grasp the impact it has on victims’ lives, acknowledge historically dismissed epistemic 
agents, and reckon with their own contribution to epistemic marginalisations. The 
third section introduces Audre Lorde’s theoretical and poetic work. Lorde invites 
readers to become acute perceivers of experiences of epistemic injustice, prosthetically 
incorporate the perspective of the silenced into their pool of hermeneutical resources, 
and reflect on their own arbitrary privilege. The paper concludes by addressing 
several potential criticisms. 
 
Epistemic Friction: Ideational, Moral, Experiential 
Miranda Fricker analysed two modalities of epistemic injustice (2007). Testimonial 
injustice obtains when a prejudiced hearer deflates a speaker’s credibility, while 
hermeneutical injustice covers non-accidental gaps in the collective pool of epistemic 
sources, created by erasing some groups’ experience from collective memory. Both 
forms presuppose cognitive and affective investments in negative stereotypes of 
certain individuals, which have a negative impact on the speaker as a knower and, 
more generally, as a human being. The harm is epistemic, but can extend to 
professional, economic, material, and psychological spheres. Women, Black people, 
sexual minorities, and the poor have historically experienced the simultaneous effect 
of these injustices. Testimonially, their interventions are not taken up or are not even 
solicited because, as speakers, they suffer from entrenched credibility deficits.ii When 
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prejudices are systematic and internalised, the victim’s development as a knower is 
thwarted (p. 58). Hermeneutically, members of disadvantaged groups do not 
participate in meaning-production processes on an equal footing with privileged 
individuals.iii  
Given that epistemic prejudice is hard to identify and acknowledge, tackling 
these injustices requires fine-tuned, powerful responses. I argue that certain literary 
works have several characteristics that make them particularly suitable for dislocating 
epistemic injustice. Before outlining the main argument, two preliminary points are 
necessary.  
First, many privileged individuals are unreflective about their own 
disproportionate epistemic authority and their prejudices’ impact on everyday 
judgments. And yet, given the prevalence of evidence that contradicts preconceived 
ideas, ignoring it requires effort, by individuals and collectives alike (Pohlhaus, 2012). 
Therefore, epistemic injustices are frequently the combined result of an arrogant 
failure to confront cognitive limitations, but also of active – though not always 
conscious – efforts not to acknowledge the existence of an epistemic other. This is not 
a matter of bad luck – as Fricker suggests – but the result of a need not to know by the 
dominant: knowing would destabilise their identity and sense of entitlement (Medina, 
2012, p. 215). The clearest example is the erasure of shameful episodes and of certain 
inconvenient groups’ voices from political memory, science, and art, (i.e. history and 
science manuals, public museums, monuments, rituals, and inventories of scientific 
breakthroughs). In other words, as Charles Mills poignantly argued, we are 
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responsible for the epistemic environment we live in and we do have some agency to 
worsen or improve epistemic injustice, individually and collectively (2007). Therefore, 
a plausible and potentially effective redress project must affirm both individuals’ and 
collectives’ responsibility for epistemic injustice and valorise both individual virtues 
and structural reform.  
A second point worth making is that poverty, gender oppression, racialisation, 
unequal access to education and professions, ethnocentrism, and cultural imperialism 
constitute the non-epistemic sources of epistemic injustice (McConkey, 2004; 
Anderson, 2012; Bohman, 2012; Medina, 2013b). Given that epistemic, ethical, 
economic, cultural, and political marginalisations are interlinked, appropriate 
remedies cannot surgically address only the epistemic dimension of injustice. 
Educational reform – ensuring equal access and quality, making assessment 
anonymous, and demystifying history curricula (Alcoff, 2010, Langton, 2010) – is 
imperative. Revising the myths of recalcitrant white male academia (Mills, 2007) and 
enabling its pluralisation – as well as that of the publishing industry – is equally 
important. Also problematic are our selective, biased habits of historical remembering. 
Most importantly, we need to fundamentally change the allocation of citizenship 
status, and of the resources necessary for meaningfully exercising citizen rights. To 
achieve these goals, individual epistemic modesty must be supplemented with 
collective political mobilisation: 
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[W]e are each complicit in the perpetuation of unjust structures, practices, and 
institutions. Moral responsibility concerns not only what I can and should do, 
but also what we can and should do together (Haslanger, 2015, p. 12). 
Motivating individuals to join collective struggles against epistemic injustice requires 
prior processes of individual and collective acknowledgement and engagement with 
the reality of epistemic injustice and the injustices it interlocks with. The epistemically 
dominant must learn to respond to evidence about the other’s credibility, while 
simultaneously reflecting on themselves as positioned knowers enjoying credibility 
excesses. Such learning has structural preconditions. As Medina aptly suggests, spaces 
where productive epistemic friction between different perspectives can yield 
alternative sources of meaning must be institutionalised (2013b). This paper proposes 
that certain literary works can open such spaces.iv 
Friction refers to the discomfort individuals experience when confronted with 
different pictures of epistemic authority and agency than the ones they are invested 
in cognitively, emotionally, and sensorially. It highlights three categories of 
limitations, which converge when we inflict – or contribute to – epistemic injustice: of 
our ideas, concepts and the collective pool of meaning they constitute (conceptual-
hermeneutical); of our sense of justice (moral-political); and of our capacity to feel with 
the other (emotional-sensorial). These dimensions of experience are only analytically 
separable; they are imbricated in everyday experience: systems of beliefs are 
internalised, emotionally anchored, and embodied, while our emotional reactions and 
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practices of embodiment translate and reinforce systems of beliefs.v Let’s unpack these 
in turn.  
The encounter with certain works can, first, cause tension between our concepts 
and beliefs about, for example, knowledge, epistemic agency, truth, epistemic 
authority, and justice on the one hand, and the artistic representations of epistemic 
injustice or authority on the other. This I call ideational epistemic friction. Philosophers 
of art propose that literature, painting, cinema, and music can stimulate us 
cognitively: they prompt thoughts, perceptions, and desires. Through selection, 
amplification, correlation, or juxtaposition of various objects, art can ‘draw attention 
to features of objects, place them in context, display their consequences, and draw 
comparisons between them.’ (Young, 2001, p. 82) We form new ideas in response to 
scenarios in a novel, play, poem, or painting. These ideas may be clear and take 
propositional form or remain latent and inchoate, actualised in future interactions, 
often unconsciously. In this sense, art can enhance our practical knowledge. Certain 
artworks can also provide conceptual knowledge.vi In engaging with complex plots, 
questioning, interpreting, and judging events and characters in a novel, poem, or 
novella, we may become aware of the limits of our concepts and deep-rooted beliefs, 
and of our habits of seeing – and feeling about – the social world. Exposure to diverse 
uses of the same concept in different fictional circumstances helps us realise the 
tension between our understanding of a concept’s range and its possible range. Novel, 
unexpected uses of a concept to cover events, actions, characters we do not usually 
associate with it can stimulate epistemic friction. Changes in a spectator’s conceptual 
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apparatus trigger both implicit and explicit changes in thought, feeling, and behaviour 
(Wilson, 1983). 
Regarding epistemic marginalisation, the limits of our concepts translate – at 
the macro level – into the limits of our pool of epistemic sources, i.e. of collective 
categories and meanings for making sense of reality. In challenging and/or refining 
received ideas and beliefs, expanding the scope of our concepts and/or proposing new 
concepts, literary works can illuminate overlapping injustices in general, and oft-
unacknowledged epistemic injustice in particular. Moreover, they can challenge ideas 
about the distribution of epistemic authority among citizens along gendered, 
racialised, classed or other dimensions of distinction, and focus our attention on 
groups’ unequal access to institutional meaning-making processes.  
Second, certain literary works can cause moral epistemic friction: they perplex us 
by revealing the limits of our sense of justice, i.e. of who is owed duties of justice, 
including duties of epistemic justice: to listen to, solicit testimony from, and include 
in collective hermeneutical processes. Additionally, they can problematise injustices 
citizens rarely perceive and often unreflectively inflict on others – epistemic injustice 
being one such example.  
Aestheticians think art crucial for ‘moral agents’ need to perceive morally 
relevant aspects of experience, to have morally sensitive and apt emotional responses, 
and to take up morally challenging perspectives in the imagination.’ (John, 2001, p. 
335). Depictions of moral exemplars richly illustrate moral attitudes, feelings and 
sensibilities in imagined circumstances, highlighting their relevance, nuances, and 
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weight. In resonating with spectators’ moral reality, works can push them to think 
and feel, to see the limits of their own experience and coarse-grained image of the 
moral-political universe. In richly experiencing art, we are invited ‘to perceive, 
imagine and feel aptly’ (p. 339): to ponder over the scope of our sense of justice, i.e. 
the scope of our community of moral relevance. Through a thick engagement with a 
multiplicity of particulars, art can diffuse the temptation for simple, stark moral 
dichotomies and reasoning (Nussbaum, 1990). The knowledge we get is practical, 
‘about how to act and how to look at moral situations.’ (Young, 2001, p. 101). The 
development of ‘a rich qualitative seeing’ and ‘discerning perceptions’ can make us, 
in Henry James’s famous words, ‘finely aware and richly responsible’ to the mire of 
moral complexity – conflict, ambiguity, riskiness – we live in (Nussbaum, 1990, pp. 
36, 142).  
Zooming in on epistemic injustice, artworks could call attention to individual 
and collective moral duties to remedy unjust distributions of epistemic authority. 
Moral epistemic friction between our unreflective sense of epistemic duties and the 
artistic representation of epistemic harms or epistemic agency can help expand the 
scope of our obligations and rectify deep-seated ideas about the economy of 
credibility. In response to poignant representations, we feel outrage and indignation 
– typical moral reactive attitudes – on behalf of the epistemically marginalised. Such 
reactions constitute a first step towards recognising and building solidarity with the 
silenced. Depictions of exemplars of epistemic resistance can lead us to reflect on our 
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own participation in – or indifference to – overlapping patterns of oppression and 
their nefarious effects.  
Finally, certain representations of epistemic injustice can highlight the limits of 
our capacity to feel for those whose lived experience we cannot – or will not – grasp. 
Experiential epistemic friction emerges from our failures to register and form a concern 
for the epistemic, psychological, political, economic, and cultural costs victims of 
epistemic injustice experience. Thus, they reveal the bounds of our emotional 
sensibility, i.e. of our affective responsiveness to the complex suffering of the silenced. 
Additionally, since the difficulty of imagining how it would be to live their life is one 
of the main obstacles, it would be productive to harness these representations’ power 
to help us transcend our limited experiential horizon. Thus, artworks teach us ‘what 
it would feel like’ to live through certain events, to experience the world from a certain 
perspective or feel a certain emotion. Nussbaum argues that novels – and we can add 
other art forms – push us to imagine possible relations between ourselves and the 
protagonists, identify with them, and perceive the similarities or differences between 
us. (1990, p. 95) Emotionally, artworks represent emotions per se, but also objects 
associated with particular emotions. (John, 2001) To the extent that these associations 
are bewildering or upsetting, they stress the limits of our capacity to feel in relation to 
certain members of our community. More precisely, representations of experientially 
different perspectives challenge spectators’ emotional repertoire, including the scope 
of their empathy.  
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Returning to epistemic injustice, certain literary texts can expose us to what it 
feels to be its victim: systematically discounted as a credible knower and prevented 
from contributing to collective meanings. Representations of the emotional costs of 
affirming one’s epistemic authority can be illuminating, compounded as they are 
across several dimensions of one’s social existence. As Lorde shows, the frustrating 
and humiliating ways in which one experiences ‘deafness’vii and indifference – by 
fellow citizens and institutions alike – can be made present to the dominant through 
artistic encounters. Moreover, depictions of epistemic injustice can prefigure an 
alternative world, where the pain associated with marginalisation disappears. 
For epistemic friction to emerge in these three registers, spectators must be 
seduced into renouncing the search for coherence between their past experiences and 
artistic representations. One’s experience is limited by positionality; therefore, 
coherence cannot reliably test the validity of knowledge obtained from artistic 
encounters.viii Relying on our emotions as a compass to the ‘rightness of a 
perspective’ix is also problematic: our emotional investments are never neutral. For 
example, we can feel very strongly attached to skewed visions of epistemic 
competence because of our emotional investment in arbitrary hierarchies of epistemic 
authority.  
The rightness of perspectives emerging from an artwork is a function of its 
affirming equal epistemic status and giving voice to the silenced – thus rendering 
more complex a society’s vision of reality. Reductionist and exclusionary 
representations – that affirm differential epistemic, political, cultural status – are not 
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knowledge-enhancing, but reality-confirming. The more intricate and inclusive a 
picture of our epistemic, moral, emotional, and sensorial reality an artwork presents, 
the more likely it is to enrich our vision. 
Artworks can also serve cathartic and therapeutic functions in that they enable 
the marginalised to communicate the experience of epistemic injustice. This paper, 
however, focuses on those works that can cause ideational, moral, and experiential 
friction in the horizons of the dominant, either by revealing the other’s experience of 
silence or their epistemic authority. In other words, we are interested in artworks that 
constitute epistemically powerful media of knowledge and potential tools for social 
change, which can seduce the dominant into practices of self-knowledge, as well as 
political transformation. To the extent that the friction catalysed by these artworks 
reverberates more broadly, the potential for solidarity across epistemic boundaries 
increases. When institutionalised – through their canonisation or introduction in 
school curricula – they can have a lasting effect on the distribution of epistemic 
authority and the collective pool of meaning.x 
 
Art’s Knowledge 
Before delving into the mechanisms of friction and the faculties involved, a caveat is 
necessary: this paper does not propose artworks as alternatives, but as complements 
to the legal, educational, political, and economic strategies outlined in the literature. 
Given the connection between epistemic and other injustices and their psycho-
political underpinnings, theorists must search for multi-pronged approaches to the 
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thorny problem of socialising aptly perceiving citizens. Resonating literary works 
constitute just one more path to explore. 
In considering art’sxi epistemic functions, philosophers have argued that it can 
provide us with an awareness of, a perspective on, or insight into various dimensions 
of our world (Wilson, 1983; John, 2002; Young, 2001). In political theory, following 
Hannah Arendt’s argument that storytelling discloses important aspects of reality, 
researchers have claimed that both historical and fictional accounts can ‘stimulate and 
enrich political thought, as well as destabilise reductive, obfuscating narratives’ 
(Mediatore, 2003), help us comprehend unprecedented historical events (Disch, 1994; 
Pía Lara, 2007; Bleicker, 2009; Thaler, 2014; Schiff, 2014), illuminate the meaning of 
historical contingencies (Hutchinson, 2010), denounce historical injustices (Mihai, 
2014), and serve as means of self-presentation for subjects involved in struggles for 
social inclusion (Pía Lara, 1998). Political theorists generally agree that certain 
representations can sometimes trigger individual and collective processes of 
reckoning with the limits of self-knowledge, knowledge about one’s relationality with 
others and about the political world.   
In what follows I discuss the features and processes by virtue of which certain – 
not all – literary works can feed individual and collective transformation. The 
argument is that certain works engage with the dominant’s ideational, moral and 
experiential (emotional-sensorial) abilities, simultaneously puzzling them 
intellectually, awakening their moral capacities, intensifying their feelings, and 
surprising them sensorially. That is to say, they stimulate processes of epistemic friction 
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between, on the one hand, concepts, beliefs, attitudes, feelings, and experiences of an 
object – in our case, the epistemic other – and, on the other hand, the representation 
of this object in art. Thus, they can undermine the need not to know, rearranging desires 
and subverting the ‘monoculture’ of most minds.xii 
This paper zooms in on epistemic friction that capitalises on literary works’ 
capacity to pleasurably sabotage our complex epistemic limitations and prostheticallyxiii 
expand the pool of hermeneutical resources on which our engagement with the world 
relies. Several features make them particularly suited for provoking friction without 
risking reactionary entrenchment.  
 First, novels, novellas, or poems are located within particular lifeworlds. They 
concretise, particularise, and exemplify broader processes and experiences shared by 
groups of people. Particularisation facilitates rich and detailed accounts of the 
multiple and invisible ways that a certain political problem infects a specific person’s 
life: her relationships, professional development, psychological wellbeing, and 
political efficacy. Alison Landsberg coined the term ‘prosthetic memory’ to refer to 
engagements with artworks – including highly popular forms – that invite the viewer 
to see the world from a different point of view, through a different pair of eyes, from 
a different embodied positionality and emotional horizon (2004). Through encounters 
with fiction, we acquire prosthetic knowledge about experiences we never had.  
I argue that this knowledge is prosthetic in two senses. While artworks track 
experiences in the social world, these experiences are – and perpetually remain – alien 
to us; we never fully master or own them.xiv Secondly, these experiences are mediated 
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through fiction. Hence they will inevitably be experienced as awkward, enabling our 
travelling beyond our narrow position, while sitting uncomfortably within our 
worldview. Prostheses can facilitate thought, emotions, and sensorial awareness in 
that they push us to think beyond our immediate needs and wants. Particular 
representations of epistemic injustice/competence can sit uneasily with received ideas 
about who has epistemic authority and who is a knower, confronting us through the 
encounter with a different vista over the social world. Experiences that readers might 
have only an abstract idea of are thus made vividly present. Under certain conditions, 
the encounter with particularity though fiction can prosthetically support her 
imagination in its active engagement with the world.  
This brings us to the second point: literary works do not confront passive 
spectators. To the contrary, they invite spectators to relate, from within their own 
position, to the characters and situations depicted. The account of the imagination 
presupposed here is active: it is something we do, building on our own experience 
and memories. Medina argues that the imagination actively builds on past experiences 
and uses them as raw material for dealing with new, unprecedented experiences 
(2013a, p. 319). From a different perspective, Keightley and Pickering propose the 
concept of ‘mnemonic imagination’ to highlight the interplay between these two 
faculties: our memories are organised into coherent narratives via the imagination, 
while the imagination builds on sources provided by memory (2012). The imagination 
is also at work in bringing our memories into relation with the experiences of others 
who are differently positioned. This process is not just about the intellectual 
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contemplation of images and representations, but also about relying on and 
rehearsing embodied explorations of the world (Medina, 2013a, p. 331). Through 
training exercises – what Medina calls ‘mimicking’ – we learn to imagine others’ 
experiences.xv This paper proposes that the imagination sometimes helps incorporate 
the others’ experiences prosthetically into our own pool of hermeneutical sources, and 
that fiction can play a crucial role in this respect. 
Fiction is particularly propitious for this task. We feel for a character because 
we dramatically rehearse our learnt ways of putting ourselves in the shoes of the other 
(Moran, 1994; Medina, 2013a). We project ourselves and our baggage into alternative 
times and counterfactual scenarios. A gap opens between the viewer’s horizon and 
that of those represented in the artwork and in ‘this liminal, but creative space, the 
mnemonic imagination is at work’ (Keightley and Pickering, 2012, p. 189). Productive 
epistemic friction can emerge in this opening through the interplay between memory 
and the imagination. I argue that successful friction results in the imagination 
stretching to prosthetically include others’ experiences – of authority or 
marginalisation – within our repertoire of hermeneutical resources, resources we 
actualise practically at various points in time. However, success is never guaranteed: 
the individual might reject the prosthesis, her memories, habits of thought, and 
emotional investments weighing her down into despondency or resentment.xvi  
Given that the imagination does not start ab ovo – it functions positionally – 
how adventurous or reticent we are to travel varies across individuals and groups.xvii 
Different degrees of friction correspond to different degrees of identification. Readers 
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will move on a continuum ranging from refusal to deep connection: memory acts both 
as a source for and a break on the imagination, setting the parameters of the possible. 
One’s positionality is anchored within a system of meanings and experiences that 
outline the horizon of expectations. The epistemic dimension of these systems relates 
to the subject’s own authority and standards of knowledge, always understood in 
relation to others’ status as knowers. Representations of epistemic authority that 
destabilise one’s beliefs, emotions, and expectations in relation to who is a knower can 
produce discomfort and confusion, which can sometimes lead to reactionary 
entrenchment. This is why a discussion of artworks’ unpredictable capacity to 
seductively sabotage epistemic bias is necessary here.  
Third, the seductive sabotage relies on two main features of literary works: 
their hedonic and mediated nature. While Medina has put his faith in hermeneutical 
heroes (2013b), I propose that the combination of hedonic and cognitive processes – of 
pleasure and knowledge – can lure spectators to travel outside their comfort zone, 
welcome epistemic friction, and accept the prosthetic addition of the others’ 
experience within their hermeneutical pool of resources. The metaphor of ‘seduction’ 
refers to the very fact that pleasure is involved in the consumption of artistic products. 
This paper does not embrace a simplistic understanding of pleasure, but one that 
incorporates discomfort and pain. In this sense it subscribes to a ‘rich theory of art’ 
according to which individuals purposefully seek and enjoy painful art because they 
appreciate ‘experiences that are cognitively, sensorially, and affectively engaging: that 
is, rich experiences’ (Smuts 2014, p. 132). Reflecting on the humanities, Spivak uses the 
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metaphor of ‘contamination’ (2013, p. 9), which is just as effective at articulating the 
idea that literary works insinuate themselves into the reader’s memory via the 
imagination, as ‘poison’ or ‘medicine’ (p. 152), without us being fully aware of how 
exactly they get us to imaginatively reconfigure our memories, beliefs, and 
emotions.xviii It is in this sense that the encounter with literary works amounts to a 
hedonic sabotage of exclusionary epistemic perspectives and a prosthetic engagement 
with different views. 
Fourth, the travelling that art embarks us upon is ‘safe’ because the encounter 
is mediated. The spectator knows the representation ‘is not exactly about me’ – but 
about types, some of which are mere possibilities – and can therefore feel freer, 
allowing herself to learn, be captivated, and vicariously experience affectively and 
sensorially through the representation, beyond her parochial sphere of interaction. 
For artworks to sabotage bias and produce friction, they need to fulfil several 
conditions. We are looking first, for works that do not exclusively represent epistemic 
injustices in individualising and psychologising ways, as isolated accidents or 
misfortunes. The stories we tell about epistemic exclusions are crucial for determining 
the remedies we are ready to provide. To the extent that individualising and 
psychologising accounts dominate public debates, to the extent that we cannot see the 
forest for the trees, our imagination and the solutions it outlines remain limited. 
Bringing social and political forces back into the picture should not, however, lead us 
to absolve individuals of any responsibility. Representations of epistemic injustice that 
balance the focus on individual failures with a concern for the structural preconditions 
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of those failures are more likely to illuminate spectators in ways that reveal the limits 
of both self-knowledge and collective epistemic resources.  
Second, we need artworks that seduce the spectator to immerse herself 
productively and experimentally in alternative scenarios, scenarios that are 
uncomfortable, but attractive and tolerable because of the pleasurable elements in art 
and its mediated nature. Predictably by now, art that shows the limits of our 
conceptual apparatus, of our sense of justice, and of our ability to hear and feel for the 
other (i.e. art that can lure us away from our own epistemic laziness and arrogance, 
and motivate us to initiate transformative political action) is desirable. In this sense, 
artworks that show historically excluded knowers as possessing epistemic authority 
or resisting exclusion are as valuable as representations of the painful experience of 
silencing. Conceptually, artworks that highlight the insularisation of the epistemically 
dominant from alternative communities of meaning are extremely valuable. Morally, 
depictions of exclusions from the moral community can lead us to question the limits 
of our sense of justice and its adjacent reactive attitudes. Experientially, attunement to 
fellow human beings is the hoped-for effect of epistemic friction through artistic 
encounters, protected from the risks and dangers of real-life embroilments.  Because 
of these functions, certain artworks can kick-start collective political action to alleviate 
the pernicious effects of epistemic – and interrelated – injustices.  
To illustrate this abstract theoretical proposal, the paper now turns to a body 
of work that invites us to conceptually, morally, and experientially (emotionally and 
sensorially) visit the world of the epistemically excluded. 
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A Sewerplant Grows in Harlem: Redeeming the Power of the Word 
Audre Lorde (1934–1992) is one of the most distinctive and celebrated voices in black 
feminist theory and poetry. A militant and the author of several poetry books, 
philosophical essays, and a novel, she was the founder of the Kitchen Table: Women 
of Color Press, whose mission was to disseminate and encourage work by black 
women authors. The ‘black, lesbian, feminist, mother, poet warrior’ dedicated her 
work to challenging interlinked epistemic, political, and social injustices against black 
women in US academia, within the feminist movement of the 1960s and 1970sxix, and 
in society at large. This section argues that Lorde’s work exemplifies the argument 
advanced here. The path-breaking character of her interventions in debates over 
racialisation, gender, sexuality and class, the enthusiastic reception of her work, and 
its inclusion in various humanities curricula make Lorde a perfect illustration of how 
art’s power can be harnessed to create epistemic friction, reverberate, and politically 
mobilise individuals against complex injustices.xx Her work has inspired processes of 
self-recreation in her audiences and has fuelled collective struggles for equality in the 
US and South Africa. The (partial) canonisation of her work means that she can still 
provoke epistemic friction inside and between individuals coming to her work from 
various positions in the epistemic hierarchy of contemporary societies. I first outline 
Lorde’s philosophical account of poetry’s role in an unjust society and then briefly 
analyse a poem that seductively sabotages epistemic bias and prosthetically supports 
readers in their encounter with the experience of the epistemically excluded.  
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In Poetry Is Not a Luxury (1984), Lorde articulates her ideas on the relationship 
between poetry and action. Poetry simultaneously constitutes a source of knowledge 
and a form of resistance that can counteract entrenched epistemic exclusions. Poetry 
births new concepts: it can ‘give name to the nameless so it can be thought’, enabling 
the marginalised to capture their own reality in language and communicate it, 
overcoming the silence imposed on them, a silence they often internalise out of fear 
(p. 37). New concepts challenge the dominant’s limited common sense and invite her 
to think about the limits of the collective pool of meanings. Moreover, poetry provides 
the audience with experiential knowledge as it distils the experience of the excluded. 
In it, their hopes, anger, and fears are expressed and shared in a way that ‘feels right’ 
(p. 37). This aspect is cathartically useful for the victims, but also epistemically 
valuable for the dominant, who are invited to see what it feels like to be on the 
receiving end of injustice. Writing poetry is therefore not a luxury, but an existential 
necessity, a bulwark against ‘falsely benign accusations of childishness, of non-
universality, of self-centeredness, of sensuality’ (p. 38). In this enumeration, we 
recognise the typical manoeuvres of systemic epistemic discrediting that normally 
target women and racialised groups. The essay thus denounces the strategic use of 
language and labelling for delegitimising purposes. Heretical poems are fuelled by 
dreams of alternative futures of equality and constitute, in themselves, forms of self-
affirmation and daring political action. Consequently, for Lorde poetry can 
conceptually, experientially, and morally enrich the poet’s self-understanding, 
express agency, and propose a different future to those who can read it responsively. 
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It is, simultaneously, a means to care for and protect the epistemic self of the excluded, 
and a call to take responsibility for injustice, clearly addressed to resisters and the 
epistemically dominant. 
The author is aware of the fragility and limitations of success when it comes to 
challenging epistemic hierarchies within ‘structures defined by profit, by linear 
power, by institutional dehumanisation’ (p. 39). She knows epistemic injustice is 
always coupled with political, educational, and economic marginalisation. 
Establishing ‘one beachhead of real resistance to the deaths we are expected to live’ 
requires courage and a language that can express the dreams of the excluded to those 
who have not been listening (p. 38). Poetry is a vehicle for the courage to see and speak 
in a different voice, to confront and denounce the epistemic oppressor, revealing the 
epistemic harms of infantilisation and delegitimisation.  
 Lorde’s poem that directly tackles the experience of epistemic injustice is A 
Sewerplant Grows in Harlem, Or I’m A Stranger Here Myself When Does The Next Swan 
Leave (1997, p. 109). First, it provides us with important experiential insights into the 
lives of those not heard despite ‘bursting with knowledge’ and screaming ‘over and 
over’ in ears ‘asleep or drugged perhaps by a dream of words.’ The lack of 
responsiveness by hearers resembles sleep or narcosis, a slumber induced by 
stereotypical projections (‘dreams’) of what the other is like. For Lorde, sleep and 
narcosis are metaphors for a blunting of the senses and capacity for reflection, leading 
to repeated failures of uptake, and the associated annihilation of the speaker as a 
knowing subject. The frustration with, and the deadly effect of, being blocked by 
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unresponsive interlocutors is represented though an amplified repetition of verses 
that simulate an automatic message for defective phonelines:   
The mind 
you have reached is not a working mind 
Please hang up 
And die again. (1997, p. 109) 
Lorde does not view epistemic injustice as merely interpersonal, but as structural. She 
refers to the powerful ‘editorial They’ who ‘smother the actual Us’ trapped in a room 
with ‘filthy windows’ and a No Exit sign above its only door. Read literally, Lorde 
might be referring to unequal access to publishing in the US of her lifetime, a situation 
she worked to remedy by founding her own press. Read metaphorically, the ‘editorial 
They’ stands for the hermeneutical injustice perpetrated against voices excluded from 
contributing to collective processes of meaning-making, the dominant’s insensitivity 
to their vision of reality and to the walls separating the occupants of various positions 
in the social hierarchy. Escaping depends on the prisoners’ word hopefully being 
‘made flesh made steel made shit’xxi and rammed into the door like a ‘homemade 
bomb’ or flushing it in a verbal fountain that brings forth a new reality. The trust in 
the word’s capacity to make possible actual social change is hinted at from the 
beginning of the poem. Lorde seems to be inciting the epistemically excluded to speak 
and engage in forms of political action that can effectively undermine the ‘editorial 
They’, i.e. make hearers receptive.xxii As Ferguson (2012) emphasises, personal and 
political transformations are indissolubly coupled in Lorde’s work. 
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Ideationally, the poem points to the urgency of change – political, epistemic, 
economic – and proposes that redemption still lies with the word, which can spur 
political action. Read alongside the essay Poetry Is Not a Luxury, the poem suggests 
poetry constitutes a weapon against the scatological nightmare of exclusion. Morally, 
it has three objectives: to express moral indignation, to articulate the psychological 
and identity harms associated with being shut down, and to imperiously ask the 
sleeping to stretch their sense of justice to cover those whom they have historically 
excluded. Conceptually, the poem expands our understanding of what it means to die. 
In denying the speaker the status of knower and equal contributor to a society’s 
conversation about collective goals, unresponsive hearers condemn her to a form of 
social death. As a natural phenomenon, death is marked by the inability to speak, but 
Lorde wants to expand the domain of the concept by using it to cover the experience 
of not being heard despite speaking, over and over again. This is a recurring strategy 
in Lorde’s work, as she repeatedly refers to the experience of political, economic and 
epistemic exclusion in terms of the ‘death we are expected to live’ (Lorde, 1984, p. 38). 
Finally, A Sewerplant is revealing experientially because of the way in which it intensely 
represents the death-like effect of not being heard. The emotional and sensorial effects 
of epistemic and political marginalisation are made immediate using scatological 
metaphors. Residing at the margins is like being smothered in shit, in a room with 
dirty windows. Not getting one’s voice across is like talking to a toilet. It is also 
emotionally draining: being edited out of the social conversation feels like being 
condemned to an iterative death: ‘Please hang up and die again’. A moving and 
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dignified plea for solidarity and for alleviating the horrid effects of silencing emerges 
from the text. 
 Through its amplifications and juxtapositions, the poem challenges the reader, 
inviting her to confront the structural reality of epistemic injustice and the experiential 
effect of being excluded as a knower. It aims to dynamise the mnemonic imagination 
and stimulate the spectator sensorially, morally, and emotionally, sabotaging her 
received ideas about differential epistemic authority. It also offers a prosthetic view 
into another’s experience, an experience one can only know imperfectly, but which 
one must make all efforts to account for. Lorde talks back to the ‘editorial They’, 
preventing easy colonisation and appropriation by the audience. At a time of 
dominant white, heteronormative, feminist literature, it contributes to the 
pluralisation of the landscape; the poem constitutes itself as a political act. For the 
marginalised reader, it is an invitation to echo the challenge to ‘them’, i.e. to use the 
word politically. To the privileged reader, it is a provocation to open herself to new 
meanings and concepts, to expand the scope of her sense of justice, to respond to and 
feel for the other. And that requires waking up from the narcosis and getting one’s 
mind working.    
 
‘Stop the Chatter Inside Their Heads’xxiii 
This paper has proposed that certain literary works can produce friction in the 
interstitial space between the spectator’s beliefs – emotionally anchored and 
embodied – and the experience of the other, as represented artistically. Friction is 
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productive to the extent that the other’s experience is added prosthetically to the 
viewer’s repertoire of knowledge and meanings. The reader learns to see the world 
from a different point of view – through a different pair of eyes, from a different 
embodied positionality and emotional horizon. Some of us are more seducible than 
others, depending on what memories we can tap into in responding to the visions of 
the world we are presented with in the artworks. Friction will not happen uniformly, 
across all persons, and therefore artworks’ seduction work is unpredictable. 
Canonising heretical voices and including them in school and university humanities 
curricula can help their power to reverberate more broadly. Canonical hierarchies are 
sabotaged by rendering them permeable to resisters’ voices. Before concluding, 
several potential criticisms need addressing. 
First, one might worry this proposal is naïve as art has historically played 
ideological, propagandistic roles in oppressive societies. This paper has not expressed 
trust in art’s transformational power per se. Art’s seductive power can be – and 
historically has been – harnessed to confirm oppressive social relations. Not all 
artworks enrich and perplex us productively along the three dimensions outlined 
above; not all narratives are revelatory. On the contrary, many seduce us into 
insensitivity and thoughtlessness. The failure to provide epistemic insight cannot be 
explained – as many philosophers of art argue it can – by exclusive reference to the 
aesthetic qualities of a work of art. As a field of the social world, art is not immune to 
power relations: there is no point in investing in the chimera of artistic 
independence,xxiv as the artistic imagination is not necessarily emancipatory. Its value 
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depends on its content and use. Romantic beliefs in the heroic, independent artist 
should give way to the realisation that independence is a matter of degree: some artists 
do a better job than others of cultivating sufficient critical distance to provoke 
epistemic friction. What we are interested in here are those artworks that, one way or 
another, make visible epistemic exclusions.  
Second, whose art is likely to cause epistemic friction? Should we focus on 
epistemically marginalised artists only? Friction-inducing works will find their 
authors both within and without the community of the epistemically marginalised. 
While this paper analyses Lorde’s poetry, the commitment to the possibility of 
solidarity pushes us to extend our reach beyond work by the epistemically excluded. 
Just as there are many reality-confirming artworks by the dominant, plenty of works 
by epistemically oppressed individuals reproduce ideas about differential authority. 
We are interested here in writing by artists who unpack epistemic injustice, denounce 
unwarranted epistemic privilege, and propose alternative, democratic visions of our 
epistemic environment. Moreover, given everyone’s responsibility for improving the 
epistemic environment of our societies, victims cannot bear alone the burden of 
fighting against recalcitrant and overlapping injustices. Different individuals will 
discharge this duty differently, depending on their resources and interests, thus 
showing solidarity with the historically silenced.xxv  
Artists who are not themselves epistemically marginalised must avoid 
contributing indirectly to silencing, i.e. reproducing the very pathology they are trying 
to redress. There are multiple ethical risks associated with non-marginalised artists 
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tackling epistemic injustice. In imagining, the imaginer is in control, the imagined 
never ‘talks back’ (Spelman, 1990). Given how hermeneutical injustice often works 
beneath the radar of consciousness, there is always a danger that we mould the 
epistemically marginalised into a familiar stereotypical image we already have of her, 
all the while remaining ourselves safe from discomfort and perplexity. This is why, to 
the extent that mnemonic imagination can be of help, it must help us sensitise – rather 
than desensitise – ourselves to the other, render us and our sense of ourselves 
vulnerable, open us up to the possibility of our own self-transformation, and lead us 
to accept that our grasping the other can never amount to mastery. On the contrary, it 
is perpetually precarious and incomplete, a never-ending experimental process, one 
that should be polyphonic and kaleidoscopic (Medina, 2012). Provided an ethos of 
self-reflection and self-relativisation is in place, i.e. that the author’s own voice speaks 
alongside – rather than instead of – the excluded, imagination can yield a multi-
perspectival vision of our shared social world, thus catalysing productive epistemic 
friction and common practices of political resistance.  
Third, are works that depict the misery and nefarious effects of epistemic 
injustice best for sabotaging bias and prosthetically travelling in the world of the 
other? From the beginning, this paper has argued that representations of epistemic 
authority by historically silenced individuals can also activate the mnemonic 
imagination productively. The Neapolitan Quartet (2012–2015) by the Italian novelist 
who writes under the pseudonym Elena Ferrante constitutes a relevant example in 
this sense. The now world-acclaimed Quartet follows the friendship between two 
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despairingly poor women from the outskirts of Naples, Elena and Lina, from 
childhood to old age. While female friendship is at the centre of the four novels, they 
also tackle the socio-economic, linguistic, gendered, and psychological obstacles that 
Elena successfully overcomes to find her voice and build an illustrious career as a 
feminist theorist and public intellectual in the Italy of the 1960s and 1970s. Ferrante’s 
virtuosic writing seduces readers to enter a world of complex, overlapping exclusions, 
marked by poverty, religious conservatism, patriarchal violence, organised crime, and 
systemic failure. Prosthetically, readers encounter Elena’s experience – her economic 
hardships, her chronic self-doubt in relation to the men writers in her life who 
misrecognise her merits, her difficulties in reconciling motherhood and writing. The 
text subtly sabotages assumptions about the classed and especially gendered 
distribution of philosophical insight, without, however, falling into reductionist 
tokenism. We are perpetually reminded of the contingency of Elena’s success, given 
her starting point: without her superhuman industriousness, encouragement, and 
financial support by various teachers and mentors, as well as the availability of 
publicly funded education, she would not have succeeded. Moreover, the contrasting 
figure of Lina who, despite being intellectually brilliant, does not manage to escape 
her socio-economic and gendered position, keeps the reader grounded in the 
structural constellations that trap the silenced.xxvi   
Lastly, how can we ensure that encounters with challenging artworks will not 
lead to negative reactions that block the possibility of epistemic friction? The answer 
is simple: we cannot. There will always be spectators who remain indifferent to artistic 
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seduction. Epistemic friction can be promoted and encouraged, but not regimented. 
The beliefs, values, interests, and emotional dispositions of the spectators are one 
important obstacle. The lack of exposure to art or an inadequate aesthetic socialisation 
– often related to class and other markers of social distinction – constitutes another 
important impediment. While receptiveness inescapably relies on a measure of effort 
and openness by the spectator, democratic societies have at their disposal institutional 
mechanisms to cultivate it: sponsoring citizens’ more equal access to art, socializing 
their habits of appreciating art, and ensuring that the art they are exposed to is 
plurivocal. Ensuring a more equal access to funding and dissemination channels for 
all artists and expanding canons to include heretical authors constitute just two 
strategies democracies should avail themselves of in the effort to rectify skewed 
perceptions of who counts as a knower. Epistemic justice cannot emerge from episodic 
encounters; on the contrary, as Spivak so poignantly explains, it requires ‘patient 
epistemological care’ (2013, p. 519, n. 57). It is this paper’s modest proposal that 
literary works can help the epistemically dominant deliver this type of care. 
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give an account of its mechanics and processes. I borrow this term from him and seek 
to theoretically unpack its complex nature and dynamics. 
v For a modified Bourdieusian account of the relationship between ideational, 
emotional, and sensorial dimensions that I assume in this paper, see Mihai (2016). 
vi For a dissenting view, see Lamarque and Olsen (1994). 
vii This is Lorde’s metaphor. I avoid metaphors like ‘deafness’ or ‘blindness’ to denote 
epistemic insensitivity, for they can contribute to the othering of disabled people. For 
a critical treatment of the metaphorical use of disability, see Mitchell and Snyder 
(2006). 
viii Young proposes the coherence test (2001, p. 107). 
ix John relies on the emotion test (2001, p. 336). 
x ‘The goal of teaching such a thing as literature is epistemological but also epistemic: 
transforming the way in which objects of knowledge are constructed; perhaps also 
shifting desires in the subject’ (Spivak 2013, p. 41). Spivak also discusses ‘staging 
collisions’ between authors belonging to different traditions to destabilise hierarchies. 
xi As a side note, this paper subscribes to an institutionalist view of the artworld – such 
as Pierre Bourdieu’s – as a social field governed by rules, principles and hierarchies of 
value and power (1993). In unpacking the characteristics through which some 
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artworks become valuable instruments against epistemic injustice, I am referring to 
the conventions that structure this field and regulate access to it, highlighting how, 
under certain circumstances, these conventions can be mobilised productively. 
xii For an undiluted trust in the humanities’ power to rearrange desires and pluralise 
the cultures of the mind, see Spivak (2013).  
xiii There is a rich and insightful literature in disability studies that dispels myths of 
full, able-bodied mastery and provides phenomenological accounts of gradual and 
heterogeneous – yet not always seamless and almost never complete – processes of 
accommodating oneself to and incorporating auxiliary objects (prostheses) into both 
one’s consciousness and embodiment by individuals who become disabled. See 
Murray (2004); Davies (2006); Lane (2006); Lundberg et al. (2011); and Salamon (2012). 
xiv We need to let go of the chimera that we could fully know and inhabit the position 
of the other. Beausoleil offers an insightful critique of mastery as the goal of any 
encounter with difference (2015).  
xv While I agree with Medina’s main argument, I need not accept his evolutionary 
paradigm for my purposes here. 
xvi While Moran (1994) and Medina (2013a) do refer to Hume’s discussion of moral 
certainty and habit as the most important obstacle to travelling through the 
imagination, they do not focus on this challenge. This paper highlights how the 
horizon within which the mnemonic imagination works can fuel epistemic 
insensitivity. 
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xvii For two different critical accounts of placing too much trust in imagination’s 
emancipatory power see Schiff (2014) and Mihai (2016). 
xviii There is a big debate in aesthetics over the authenticity of emotions experienced 
through fiction. I agree with Moran (1994) and Medina (2013a) that these emotions are 
real and that it is only the object of the emotion that is fictional. It is not the case that 
we are imagining a fictional emotion; we are imagining with emotion.   
xix Ortega (2006) provides an excellent account of Lorde’s potential antidotes to the ill 
of white feminist ‘loving, knowing ignorance’. 
xx For accounts of her poetic work and political activism, as well as her influence on 
individual self-creation and collective struggles see De Veaux (2004), Griffin and 
Parkerson (1995), Guerrero (2012). Aptheker (2012) provides an account of the 
enchanting force of using Lorde’s work in the classroom. 
xxi The poem is full of references to Western culture, from the Bible to the Knight of the 
Swan legend. I propose these references have a double function. First, they serve 
metaphorical purposes. For example, ‘the word made flesh, made steel, made shit’ 
could be read as a modification of the Biblical syntagm to point to language’s capacity 
to change the world. Second, I suggest, they point to the need to rethink canons and 
their exclusions, to expand and transform. I thank Tracy Strong for pointing my 
attention to some of these references. 
xxii Gloria Anzaldúa proposes something similar when she writes: ‘I say mujer mágica, 
empty yourself. Shock yourself into new ways of perceiving the world, shock your 
readers into the same. Stop the chatter inside their heads.’ (Anzaldúa, 1983, p. 172). 
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xxiii This is Anzaldúa’s powerful injunction (1983, p. 172). 
xxiv For an excellent criticism of the mirage of independence see Drucker (2005). 
xxv For example, in cinema, Mathieu Kassovitz, one of the most famous French 
directors of his generation, wrote and directed the award-winning La Haine, which 
denounced the racialised, political, economic, geographical and epistemic exclusion 
of poor, Muslim, Jewish, and Afro-French citizens. Alain Juppé, then PM of France, 
requested that the cabinet watch this film and reflect on its powerful depiction of 
marginalisation. Michael Haneke is another example of an established European 
cinema coryphaeus who dealt with themes relevant for this paper. His Caché has often 
been read as a denunciation of colonial erasure for its references to French Algerians’ 
exclusion from the community of knowers, political memory, citizenship and 
ultimately, humanity. 
xxvi Ferrante talks of her own struggle to come to grips with the experience of being a 
successful woman writer in a profession dominated by men and patriarchal traditions. 
She details her frustration with how literary canons are reproduced, despite feminist 
gains, which – she reminds us – are precarious (2016, especially Letters III).  
